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Article:

Do the Justices Read their Press Clippings? Thomas Sowell

Case: Harperv. Virginia Department of Taxation
Press Commentary

"The Clarence Thomas Confirmation: A Retrospective"
by The Honorable Laurence 14. Silberrnan'
Now that almost a year has passed since the nomination of Clarence
Thomas to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States,
it seems an appropriate time to reflect on the events. There is much for me
to remember.

Clarence Thomas Is my friend, and my wife was one of his

most outspoken proponents and defenders during his confirmation, sc I admit
to have suffered at the misery inflicted upon him. But confirmations-as I have
said before--are political, and therefore federal judges should not be heard to
express a view as to the right way either interest groups or senatorc should
go about supporting or opposing nominees.
It is, on the other hand, very much the business of federal judges to
comment on the manner in which other judges behave during a confirmation.
My proposition, which once would have been thought non-controversial,
indeed rather obvious, is that judges assiduously should avoid public
Involvement In this intensely political arena.
Of course the nominee, under present conditions, has no alternative but
to become something very much like a political candidate during the endless
weeks between his or her nomination and the Senate hearings. If the nominee
does not seek to marshal support with the help of political institutions, he or
she risks being crushed and personally destroyed. Nevertheless, in my view,
that necessary political posture should never be allowed to affect subsequent
Of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit. This speech was delivered at a Federalist Society'Conference entitled
"The Congress: Representation, Accountability, and the Rule of Law," The
Mayflower Hotel, Washington, D.C., June 13. 1992.

decisionmaking as a Supreme Court justice.
Nomlbees to the Supreme Court, or, for that matter, to any federal
court, shoulk, therefore, refuse to answer questions in the confirmation
hearings that bear even indirectly on controversies that will come before them.
The notion that It is perfectly appropriate to discuss the doctrinal batsis of a
class of cases, so long as the nominee avoids explicitly saying how he or she
would cast a vote In a concrete case, is, in my view, fatuous. Going down
that road, one can quickly say so much as to make a final step unnecessary.
Moreover, the reason it Is Inappropriate to indicate a vote in a particular case-that It undermines the Integrity of the subsequent adjudicatory process and
the Independence of the judiciary-applies equally to general discussions of
doctrine. In either event, the nominee, under oath, is led to restrict his or her
future freedom of decisionmaking, which is necessarily unfair to litigants. If
one Is forced, to use the famous example, to swear fealty to the right of
privacy recognized in Gifswold v. Connecticut, is not he or she psychologically
hampered if, subsequently, as a justice, he or she heears an argument that
seeks to limit or even reexamine Griswold's premises? Many.would say that
Is perfectly all right because of their strong view of the merits of Griswold, but
it should be recognized that this Is not a principled position. It is -actually
much worse for a nominee to answer these kinds of questions in the crucible
of confirmation hearings than it would be to give a public speech on the
subject. An answer to a senator's question could be seen to be a qruid pro
quo for a confirmation vote, putting a future justice or judge in a more -difficultposition to offer the requisite open mind to litigants.
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It might- be thought that this is strictly a matter for any norminee to
decide, looking only to his or her conscience, but I would disagree. The type
of confirmation dialogue we have suffered through, and now have come to
expect, as I have said, threatens the independence of the judiciary. All judges
have an Interest In protecting that independence.
I realize that, after the Bork hearings, and subsequent confirmations, the
"purist" position has become difficult to hold to, but it is time to call s halt to
the slide. Recent nominees have been astonishingly resourceful in seeking to
avoid confirmation commitments, but it gets harder and harder.

Justice

Thomas' deft use of the phrase "I have no quarrel with that decision,"' which,
of course, is exactly what any open-minded judge who has not yet read briefs
attacking a precedent should say, will, I am afraid, no longer suffice. I do not
blame senators for asking searching questions, the answers to which I believe
improper.

The responsibility to decline Is the nominee's, but he or she

deserves the full support of the judiciary and the bar,
I wish to focus this talk, however, on another aspect of the confirmation
process: the proper public role for judges regarding the appointment of other
judges or justices.

Unfortunately, the intensity of the battle over the

confirmation of Justice Thomas led judges to cut the mooring lines that should
have restrained them from drifting into the political fray.

Perhaps most

striking, Judge Jon Newman of the Second Circuit wrote an op-ed piece in
The New York 77rmes at the height of the struggle, urging the President to
withdraw the nomination and to nominate instead another black judge from
the Second Circuit who is, like Judge Newman, a Carter appointee. I do not
3

see how it could possibly be suggested that Judge Newman's dramatic entry
into the intense political controversy was appropriate conduct for Vi federal

judge. Yet, I saw no public criticism of his extraordinary action. Not from the
bar, not from the law schools, and certainly not in the press.
After Justice Thomas was confirmed, another circuit judge, this time
from the Third Circuit, former Chief Judge Leon Higginbotham, wrote Justice
Thomas an open letter, soon thereafter published in the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review.

The letter can only be described as a political

polemic. which, among other things, attacked Justice Thomas' statements
when Chairman of the EEOC and the positions of American conservative
political figures such as Presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush.

The

letter's patronizing tone, telling a new justice how to vote, was surely in
shockingly bad taste, but its political cast-it could have served nicely as an
election campaign speech--breached any conceivable standard of judicial
ethics. Again, not a word was raised in protest by the bar, nor in academia.
And the press covered Judge Higginbotham's screed with unconcealed
admiration and delight.
For some of us on the D.C. Circuit, the incident relating to the Thomas
confirmation fight that reflected most poorly on the judiciary was the
unprecedented and dishonorable leak of the substance of a preliminary draft
of one of then-Judge Thomas' opinions.

It is, of course, likely that this

violation of the confidentiality of the court's deliberative process was
committed by one or more judicial clerks.

But we know that the reporter

sought to persuade clerks to violate their ethical obligation by arguing that the

4

judge, or-judges, for whom they clerked would approve the leak.

That

suggests that It is also likely that the clerk, or clerks, who did so believed that
they were acting consistently with their judge's wishes, whether or not that
was true.
Whatever the leaker's exact motive, and it surely included the desire to
Injure Justice Thomas' confirmation prospects, our court, In my judgment,
made a profound mistake in not Investigating the matter. Retired Chief Judge
Gibbons was surely right when he said publicly at the time "that the judges
of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit should Immediately
take steps to Identify the source of the,. . . report."

We should have used,

as did the Senate, a special counsel retained for that purpose.

It cannot

seriously be argued that a court is powerless to respond, and thus is unable
to discourage future leaks of preliminary positions on cases sub

judice.

Sometimes those cases have enormous economic, social, and political
consequences. Disclosure of preliminary positions of a judge or judges not
only undermines the work of the court, which necessarily must take place in
confidence, but it also disserves the interests of litigants and the public. As
for the expressed objection that an investigation would have failed to identify
the guilty, and so was not worth trying, that is a peculiar view for those
responsible for upholding the law.

In any event, 11am quite certain an

investigation would indeed have pointed rather easily to the leaker or leakers.
It seems that Mr. Fleming's effort on behalf of the Sonate turned out to be
more fruitful than early press accounts revealed--as readers of The Wal Street
Journal and The Washington imes editorial pages learned.
5

There -has been a good deal of confusion as to exactly what the D.C.
Circuit did about our leak. Two misImpressions have spread. One is that the
issue of an investigation is still alive, and the other is that the Chief Judge
somehow had authority, which he exercised, to block an investigation.
Neither is true. We actually decided the question last November In a formal
manner when we voted 6-6 (with a senior judge voting as has been our
practice) to defeat a motion to conduct an investigation.

Thereafter, our

deliberations concerned only whether we would disclose our decision--and the
vote--to the public.and, it so, in what manner. I thought, and still do, that,
given the public importance of the issue, we all had an obligation to tell the
public what we decided. There cannot. however, be any valid objection to my
open disclosure of our decision now, especially after we have seen - a
newspaper account that purports to describe the views of judges (distorted
I might add) expressed in that private session. It certainly would have been
much better if we had announced our decision forthrightly as a court at the
time the opinion issued. I have not been able to discern any good reason why
the court (or, for that matter, Individual judges) should not disclose its (or
their) position on such an Issue.
In any event, notwithstanding the unprecedented and obviously
damaging nature of the leak, again, I did not see any criticism from the bar,
academy, or the press as to our inaction. I suppose it was to be expected
that the press would not readily bite the hand that feeds It. The Legal 77mes,
the recipient of the leak, sought to protect its source not only from

identification but also, In clever ways, from any rebuke. I wonder, however,
6

whether if this. sad event had occurred during the nomination of a judige with
an apparently different approach to judging, the press would have beien more
probing and more critical.
All of these episodes that reflect badly on the judiciary ocoiurred in
connection with Justice Thomas' nomination, but we see -other disquieting
signs that federal judges are willing to engage openly in public criticism of the
Supreme Court in a political fashion. Recently, Judgo Noonan of the Ninth
Circuit wrote an op-ed piece, again, not surprisingly, In The New York 7imes,
openly disagreeing with the Court's recent disposition of the Robert Alton
Harris case, in which the Ninth Circuit was ordered to stop efforts to interfere
with Harris' execution. Judge Noonan even accused the Court of causing the
Ninth Circuit to commit "Treason to the Constitution." If I am right that this
sort of behavior is stunningly inappropriate, and also unprecedented, we must
ask, why is it occurring now? What is it in our present environment that
causes judges to cut the tacit and explicit ethical restraints that had been
thought to prevent such conduct?
To answer the question, one must think about what It is that influences
judges once they are appointed. I mean, of course. what influences them
other than parties' arguments in litigation and the expected consultation with
other judges. We can discount out of hand the organized bar, and not totally
to Its discredit.

Lawyers, after all, are not in a particularly advantageous

position to influence the behavior of judges.

Time was when scholarly

criticism at our law schools had some impact. Not so today. AmericMn law
schools have changed dramatically in only the 30 years since I left Harvard.
7

Whereas then. there was a broad consensus within the faculty, across the
political spectrum, as to the appropriate role of judges, that consensus fell
apart In the '60s during the heyday of the Warren Court. Now, many of our
most competitive law school faculties are dominated by those who wholly
reject the basic premise that animated legal scholarship in 1960--that judges
are in the business of trying to discern and apply neutral principles. For those
professors, judicial decisionmaking is simply a charade, masking oppression.
Thus, the law reviews today are full of articles exploring endless varialions on
a Marxist theme. All that is necessary to comprehend the author's concept
is to understand how he or she measures the oppressed class.

Most law

reviews have therefore become virtually irrelevant to judges.
Judges do, however, hire law clerks every year, and .clerks are recent
products of the law schools. Of course clerks do influence judges--sometimes
all too much. One of my former clerks told me of an ad'vocacy group meeting
a few years ago at a prominent law school where a faculty member who had
clerked for a Supreme Court justice told the group exactly how this particular
justice had been manipulated over the years-captured, if you will--by his
activist law clerks. Not surprisingly, given the overwhelming endorsement of
various kinds and degrees of judicial activism in the law schools, the supply
of potential clerks who believe in, indeed even comprehend, notions of judicial
restraint does not begin to match the number of incipient judicial activists.
Law clerks are not, to be sure, directly responsible for inducing judges
to engage in inappropriate political activity.

They can, however, subtly

reaffirm the notion that the outcomes of judicial activism are so important that
8

virtually anything is justified to protect those decisions. To put it another
way, judges, or nominees, who believe in a more limited role for the judiciary
are thought in the academy to be in some sense illegitimate. Therefore, recent
graduates may reinforce the view that illegitimate means can be used to
oppose them so as to preserve activist precedents.
Still, I believe the more important influence and the key explanation for
the recent misbehavior of judges is the press. Mr. Dooley said, as you will
recall, that judges follow the 'lection returns. That is not really so. They, of
course, owe their appointments to the electoral process, but in pest decades
the courts, perhaps particularly the Supreme Court, have seemed to take pride
in ignoring popular will. Federal judges have instead appeared parlicularly
prone to listen very carefully to the views of what has been described as the
"new class" or, lately, the "chattering classes."

In the United Stateis, that

very much means the press.
It is a commonplace that in a democracy we expect the press to patrol
the abuses of government officials. Certainly the press often performs that
role. Why, then, has it not restrained judges from getting into the political
disputes I have described? Why Is It that these judges know in their bones,
if you will, that a certain kind of public utterance or action, regardless of its
impropriety, will not be questioned? The answer, as I have foreshadowed, is
that the American working press has, to a man and woman, accepted and
embraced the tenets of judickil activism. Unlike the law schools, wheire one
can still find a few professors who assert the virtues of Judicial restraint, I
have never met a legal reporter who holds to that view. Some columnists and

editorial writers. to be sure-but no reporters. -And the-cumulative weight of
American legal reporters overwhelms those few columnists or editoriall writers
whose opinions are openly on display.
I once thought that was so because journalists covering the courts are
primarily non-lawyers and might therefore be thought to be interested only In
cases as policy issues. But the truth is that the lawyer/reporters are among
the most unbalanced-the least abashed at asserting the value of judicial
activism. The worst, in my view (with the notable exception of the "wicked
witch of the airwaves"), are found in the pages of The New York rimes,
whose general news coverage in recent years has seemed to approach a daily
version of The Nation. We never realized how much discipline Abe Rosenthal
exercised until he retired and the advocates were allowed to run free.

It

seems that the primary objective of the Times' legal reporters is to put activist
heat on recently appointed Supreme Court justices. Torn Sowell has described
this technique as the "Greenhouse Effect,- after the 77mes' leading court
reporter. Their Washington second stringer, Mr. Nell Lewis, covers our court,
and his reporting is so obviously distorted and tendentious that it reads as if
it were a cross between the columns ot his namesakes, Anthony and Flora

Lewis.
The Tmes Is by no means unique. All American newspapers, with a
uniformity that is found with respect to other subjects that a judge does not
discuss publicly, conform generally to the same line. The Wall Street Joburnal-under the direction of its always opinionated Washington Bureau Chief Al
Hunt-The Washington Post, The Los Angeles Times, the Associated Press,
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and virtually all other papers and newsmagazines are only a step behind (I
exempt. of course, the editorial pages). The working press covers the federal
courts, indeed any American courts, as if judicial decisions were simply the
extension of polltics by other means. As Justice Scalia has remarkod, they
seem uninterested in the reasoning of opinions-which should be even more
important than the result since it is the reasoning that is really law. And
rather obviously they approve of only certain kinds of results.
It has occurred to me that one could draw a parallel between modem
judicial activism and what could be called journalistic activism.

Both likely

stem from the new class' impatience with the workings of American
democracy in the latter half of the twentieth century. If one believes that
reporters have some sort of obligation to seek objectivity in reporting, both
could be thought an abuse of power. But one probably cannot draw from the
First Amendment the same sort of corollary obligation to neutrality that one
must certainly take from Article Ill. Journalists have the legal right to be as
partial as they wish; it may be that there is no ethical obligation restraining
partiality, either. In any event, I doubt I have standing to raise that issue,
except to note the hypocrisy with which journalists discuss the matter. I can,
however, legitimately describe the nature of journalistic reporting .n the
judiciary because It has an impact on judicial behavior.
Since it is virtually impossible doctrinally to defend judicial activism in
a democracy, the strategy of those journalists who wish to support judicial
activism is to deny the possibility of judicial restraint--to challenge the notion
that there is anything to the pursuit of neutral principles, or, alternatively, to
11

so use the terms as to hopelessly confuse debate. It reminds me very much
of my experience in foreign policy. Communist and Third World opponents of
democracy would never frontally attack the concept. They would instead seek
to debase the currency by misusing the term. Thus, "democracy" was used
often to refer to coercive methods to achieve relative equality of nominal
income.

My particular favorite, though, was the phrase the Communists

Invented to describe dictatorial decisionmaking: "democratic centralism."

I

expect that, in the same Orwellian fashion, this speech criticizing judges for
political interventions will, in tum, be described as "political."
Reporters will often describe an opinion they dislike as "activist" when
it strikes down an act of Congress as unconstitutional. If one believes that
the Constitution is positive law, rather than a delegation to a continuing
constitutional convention, that charge is, of course, silly. Or sometimes we
see a court described as activist for overruling prior precedent--particularly
when the earlier decision was itself the product of press-approved judicial
activism. A decent respect for precedent Is, to be sure, an element of judicial
restraint, but the care notion infusing that philosophy is that judges are not
pollymakers and should as much as humanly possible eschew policy choices.
When a precedent is based on nothing more than such a policy choice, it may
be imprudent, but It Is hardly activist, to vote to overrule that case.
The press' ceaseless advocacy of judicial activism not only induces
judges to misbehave in the manner I have described, but it also has its Impact
on judges' decisionmaking over time. When I served in the Executive Branch,
I watched the press shape the behavior of senior appointees.
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Some, it

seemed, allowed their entire daily agendas to be set by the morning papers.
The desire to curry favor with and avoid criticism from the Washington press
corps outranked, for many, loyalty to the President or respect for Congress.
I do not think I fully appreciated, until I became a judge, however, how
much impact press coverage can have on Judges. Of course those of us who
had been Involved in judicial selection watched with great disappointment as
judges seemed to change on the bench, or, as the press would say, "grew."
It was quite frustrating to see those particular jurists come to accept and even
relish the temptations of activism. They were rewarded by being described
approvingly as "non-ideological"-deciding each case on its merits-which, as
far as I can tell, meant that they were expected to reshape the law eaich time

to conform to a desired outcome. (Ironically, hard core Warren Court-type
activists are never described as ideological.)
So, I understand better today the reason for the evolution of some
judges. More often than not it is attributable to their paying close attention
to newspaper accounts of their opinions. You would be amazed at how thinskinned some judges are. That Is why the Reagan Justice Department was
so determined at the outset of that Administration to pick academics for the
federal judiciary-particularly for the Courts of Appeal:s-those persons who
had developed a settled view of the appropriate judicial role and would not
lack the intellectual confidence to hold to it under expected criticism.
That brings me back to Justice Thomas. He was.. of course, not a law
professor, and through his years of service in the Executive Branch he
certainly-as would be expected in light of his positions-experienced rigorous,
13

even ruthless, press attacks. The President, when he announced-his intention
to nominate Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court, nevertheless, described
him as the best person available. There are a number of individuals who
would make excellent Supreme Court appointments, but I think the-President
was right. Not only does Clarence Thomas-as all the world now knows-have
the courage of a lion, he also has the kind of Intellectual integrity that
constitutes a solid foundation from which he cinnot easily be pushed. But,
in one vital respect, Justice Thomas is absolutely unique, amply justifying the
President's characterization. He is the only judge I know who is impervious
to the press influences I have described. He has, for some time, resolutely
refused to read the newspapers. There will be, I would bet my shirt, no

journalistic hole bored in his intellectual ozone level. This time, there will be
no "Greenhouse Effect."

[6/10/92]
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First Amondment
Does media coverage influence the outcome of judicial decisions?
Federal Court of Appeals Judge Laurence
Silberman of the District of Columbia is not one to
mince words. In a recent ipeech before the
conservative Federalist Society, he stuck it to the
Fourth Estate, accusing journalists of favoring
judicial activists when they cover the courts.
. Even worse, noted Silberman, some members
of the bench pander to this prejudice by tilting to
the left when they decide cases.
While a chorus of journalists blasted the judge
for his own brand of activism, we put this explosive
proposition-that judges make law with an eye to

the headlines-to two constitutional scholarn:
commentator Bruce Fein and College of William
and Mary law professor and First Amendm-nt
.
specialist Rodney A. Smolla.
Fein argues that Silberman is right in msying
that the press dotes on liberal judges, but he urges
ther to resist the bait and decide cases on
conscience.
Smolla, however, doesn't accept Silbermian's
premise and uses the news coverage of the judge's
speech to illustrate the media's neutrality and
dedication to principle.

Yess.The Press Loves Activists
lian 0. Donlas were regaled thr whelming interest," of course, is the
their activist decisions that undercut media coverage it attracts. And that
the text and purpose of various con- coverage characteristicaldy promises
stitutional provisions. Their regular media flattery for actirist judicial
reliance on notions of fairness, ema- decisions, but pejorative prose for
nations and penumbras went su- rulings that denyjudicial social engipinely unquestioned by journalists. neering ower.
Who wants
-marty2dom
for upBy contrast, Justice John Marshall
holding the Constituti n's separaHarlan, whose. less ebullient juri.
prudence was graced with deep con- tion of powers or long-h4eaded princititutional learning. recied the prom- ples of interpretation that are deniinence of an extra in a Cecil B. grated as "esoteilc" or "arcane" by
reporters intoxicated vith results?
DeMille extravanas.
Most recently, the joint plural- Who wants to risk a me aia beating a
legislative or executive prerogatives.
Supreme Court nominee Robert ity opinion ofJus tices Kennedy. San-, Ia Judge Bork in a Senate confirmsH. Bork was widely criticized for dra Day O'Connor and David Souter. tion hearing?
interpreting OSHA to permit em- in Casey expressly Justified their
Only a diminishiuig number diiployers to exclude fertile women votes by the fear that overruling Roe play the Intellectual incorruptibility
would
be
portrayed
in the media as a of Socrates and, thus like Judge
orn jobs that would endanger fetuses. By contrast, last June, the surrender to anti-abortion advocates. Silberman. unflinchingly risk media
media lauded Supreme Court Justice
obloquy and a seat on the Supreme
Anthony Kennedy for his opinions S*esage 1edlUews
Court to safeguard tonstitutional
invalidating voluntary prayers at
And a federal judge in Wichita truths.
high school graduation ceremonies recently appeared on "Nightline" to
That is healthy neither for enand reaffirming the Roe o. Wade garner favorable coverage of his in- lightened law nor the public weal.
abortion decree.
junction against picketing of abor- Constitutional principles, by definiAgain. in Panned Parenthood tion clinics by Operation Rescue. tion, stand above media kudon or
v. Casey. Justice Harry Blackmun Another federal judge in the District public opinion polls. "Lb paraphrase
urged the Senate Judiciary Commit- of Columbia smilarly turned news- Justice Robert Jacksorn, their vitality
tee to block any nominee to the paper columnist to defend his AT&T should not turn on the vicissitudes of
Supreme Court Uncommitted to Roe. divestiture decree. Who can deny political controversy .3r journalistic
That unprecedented effrontery was that the media enjoys a seat in the passions. Of course, n judge should
politely received by then media be- judicial cloister?
not reject a constitutio nal interpretacause Blackmun's cri de coeur furAs Justice Oliver Wendell tion becuse it may evoke media
thered the cause of activist jurispru. Holmes warned in Northern Securi- plaudits; but neither should a judge
dance. But how would the media ties Co. u. United States (1904). great resist an interpretation because it
have reported an exhortation by Jus- cases. like hard cases. make bad law might agitate the media.
tice Antonin Scalia to deny conflrna- "because of some accident ofimmediThe principal parpose of judition to Supreme Court candidates ate overwhelming interest which ap- cial life tenure is defeated when
reluctant to overrule Roe?
peals to the feelings and distorts the decisions are corrupted by the anticiSimilarly, Chief Justice -Earl judgment.
pated reportorial resrponses of tribWarren and Associate Justice Wil1
.What makes a case of *over- unes for activism.

BY BRUCE FEIN

Both direct evidence and human
nature corroborate Judge Laurence
H. Silberian's indictment of the
media for its complicity in judicial
activism.
The majority ofprint and broad.
cast journalists celebrate activist docisions. They are obsessed with results, not with principles of constitutional or statutory interpretation
that prevent judges from usurping
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No: A Pat Thesis
BY RODNEY A. SMOLLA

In a provocative speech Judge
Laurence H. Silberman recently attacked the manner in which the
press reports on legal issues. claiming that there is at work a journalistic activism" set on advancing an
agenda of "judicial activism."
Although he singled out The
New York Timea and its Supreme
Court correspondent Linda Greenhouse, his indactment was more sweeping, writing that "the American working press has, to a man and a woman,
accepted and embraced the tenets of
judicial activism." He attacked journalists for treating courts as political
institutions. "as if judicial decisions
were simply an extension of polities
by other means," and claimed that
journalists overemphasize the mere
results of decisions, and seem uninterested in the reasoning of cases.
The facts do not support these
claims. Take as a first exhibit the
actual texts of the "next-day" stories
that the major American newspapers and wire services run on Supreme Court decisions.-They generally oncapsulate the facts, the result,
the core doctrinal and policy judgments that comprise the majority.
concurring, and dissenting opinions.
and attempt to offer a balanced
assessment (often quoting from experts with opposing viewpoints) of
the likely impact of the decision.
The stories tend to be generous
in their quotations from all justices
who write opinions, and fair in their
selection of quotes. Legalism like
"strict scrutiny" or the "Lemon test"
are distilled and made comprehensible. And the daily news coverage of
the Court tends to go out of its way
not to be judgmental.
Take as a second exhibit the
longer analytic pieces that appear in
the mainstream press. For example,
since Judge Silberman singled out
Linda Greenhouse, I will cite her. On
the Court's controversial hatespeech decision this term. Greenhouse wrote: "The fault line that
split the Court reflects a debate with
deep roots in political theory and the
history of the First Amendment ...
between those who see f*ee speech as
an end in itself and those who see it
as a means to an end."
On the evolving identity of the
Court, Greenhouse wrote: "So if there
is a constraint on the new majority, it
may come down to this: Ideas that
are inviting as theory, and that gain

majority opinion that could change
the way people live as well as how
they view the Court."

Jewrmalistle Balance

Judge Silberman and Linda Greenhouse do have different ideological
and jurisprudential values; but certainly it is unfair to attack Greenhouse's writing (oi that of her colleaues in other news organizations)
by intimating that it lacks intellectual honesty, analytic probity or
journalistic balance.
I also have observed first-hand
how these news reports are constructed. Like many scholars. "liberal" and "conservative" (including
my friend Bruce Fein), I often get
called for reactions to cases. These
are invariably arms-length, thoughtminded, adversarial exchanges. The
journalists are vigorous in their crossexamination; they instinctively react
against attempts at "spin control';
they press me to defend positions
much like a good judge will press a
lawyer in oral argument.
When I later read the piece, I
am usually impressed by the writer's
atteupts to sort out the often confusing and controverted implications of
a new landmark decision.
Judge Silberman's speech had
many good points, including some
well-taken insights into the confirmation of Justice Clarence Thomas.
But along the way he pointedly
criticized his "activist" colleagues,
law clerks, law professors and law
reviews (the latter, for "exploring
endless variations on a Marxist
theme").
One of the saddest aspects of
the whole Thomas nomination spectacle was the tendency on all sides to
resort to hyperbole and ad homninem
attack. Judge Silberman's thoughtfAl views on "activism" are welcome
additions to our ongoing American
debate about the role of courts. But
whatever our viewpoint, it does not
advance the cause of enlightening
public discourse to caricature the
arguments of people with whom we
disagree. or to simply "blame it on
the prese."
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COURTSIDE

BY TONY MAURO

Does the Court Play to the Press Gallery?
Three
under my desk are testimony to the
dust
gathering
boxes
largerole
press in judiof the
increasing
cial nominations.
I call them the Robert Bark Box, the
David Souter Box. and the hopelessly
bulging Clarence Thomas Box (Anthony
Kennedy seemed to merit only a large
folder). Each is filled with the dozens of
reports, position papers, attacks, and
analyses prepared by interest groups and
academics in defense of or in opposition to
these nominees.
Unlike reporters on other beats around
town, Supreme Court reporters are unaccustomed to being lobbied or stroked.
On a political beat, stories are read
closely, and feedback is common. But Supreme Court and other legal stories resonate only rarely; reaction is uncommon.
Yet when a high court vacancy arises,
the paper begins to flow. With each new
nomination, the number of pages seems to
grow exponentially. Strategists will tell
you that how the press plays these nominees is of increasing importance in influencing the debate and the outcome.
But not until last week has anyone suggested publicly that the press also influences the judges and justices once they
get on the bench. Critics. notably Justice
Antonin Scalia, have attacked the press for
how it covers the courts. But not even
Scalia has suggested that our coverage influences how judges reach their decisions.
That was. however, the provocative
thesis of Judge Laurence Silberman's
wildly well-received speech before the
Federalist Society at Washington's Mayflower I itd June 13. (For the text ofSilbernne'.s speech. see "Verbatim,'
14.)
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Silberman. a judge on the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, suggested
Tony Mauro covers the Supreme Court
and legal issues for USA Today and the
Gannett News Service. His column on the
Court appears every other week insLegal

Times.

that every reporter he has met who covers
the courts believes in judicial activism
(more on that later) and that a disturbing
number of judges have been nudged into
the activist frame of mind by the press.
Silberman offered few specifics, saying
afterward that "I don't think it would be
appropriate" to mention actual cases or
judges influenced by the press. He did
mention the increasing number of federal
judges, mainly Carter appointees. who
find their way into the op-ed pages of
newspapers with views that, Silberman
said. clearly go beyond what is appropriate for judges to say. "I can't imagine
Learned Hand writing an op-ed piece,"
Silberman commented later.
We all know judges who seek to curry
favor with the press. And it is true that
Carter appointees, feeling frustrated with
the sharply different views of their Reagan
and Bush colleagues, have turned to the
press more and more, so that their opinions can have some currency somewhere.
But can it be possible that these judges.
with the protection of life tenure, actually
shape their decision-making with an eye
toward receiving favorable mention in the
press? It isfrankly difficult to imagine.
As reporter Linda Greenhouse of The

vative judges make bold rulings, they ten
to be described disparagingly as "idei
logical." When liberals do the same thinj
they are called "principled."
But Silberman's assertion that the pre,
exerts anything like the influence he suL
gests needs further fleshing-out. The ur
predictability of federal judges-from th
Supreme Court on down-ends to di:
prove his theory.
And Silberman needs to be careful n(
to take his point so far that he ends u
advocating a know-nothing approach i
judging. He came perilously close at th
close of his Federalist Society speed
when he heaped praise on Justice Thorns
for his steadfast refusal to read newspapef
at all.
"He is the only judge I know who i
impervious to the press influences I hav
described," Silberman said admiringi,
"There will be, I would bet my shirt. n
journalistic hole bored in his intellectu;
ozone level."
Refusing to buckle under to outsid
pressure is one thing. Sticking one's iea
in the sand is quite another.

The GreenhouseEffect

New York Times. one of Silberman's

named targets, says in an interview, "I've
never gotten the sense that anyone on the
bench has been led around by the nose by
the press."
Yet Silberman definitely struck a responsive chord when he said it. and comments I've heard from lawyers and others
since the specch suggest that he was giving voice to a concern privately held
by many judges throughnut the federal

judiciary.
In an interview after the speech. Silberman said that this sort of influence by
the press definitely exists, "and it
shouldn't be a surprise. . . . You have a
lot more impact than you think."
He explained it this way: "Judges are
pretty isolated. They don't talk to lawyers;

in some instances, they are forbidden to.

Laurence Silberman Journalists
have subtle effect on some judges.
So often, when they write an opinion. it
drops off the face of the earth. They never
hear about it. Some judges need to see

some reaction, so they look to the press."
Silberman is clearly right that judges
should not be playing to the crowds, deciding cases on the basis of how the press

or public will react. And it would be foolish to deny that many reporters. consciously or not, tend to look at judicial issues through a liberal lens. When conser-

Judge Silberman's provocative poii
was obscured somewhat by his unfort
nate personal attacks on reporters who. h
said, are taking advantage of their her<
tofore uncharted powers to push the coun
toward activist decision-making.
lie singled out the reporting of Nc
Lewis of The Ne,

York Times. descrihin

it as "obviously distorted and tender
tious." But Silberman did not mentio
the likely source of his animus towar
Lewis-namely a 1991 article on disses
sion within the D.C. Circuit that reporte
that Silberman had once threatened to a
sault Judge Abner Mikva. (See "Silkb
man. Dogged by Story. Provides Detai
of Outburst." Legal Times, March I
1991. Page 7.)
SEECOURTSIDE, PAGE

COURTSIDE FROM PAGE 8
-le seems to thrive on animosity."

offers Lewis. "A couple of years ago. he
tried to engage mc in a dchac hy mail
flbout another story Lewis had wrilteni. I
found his letters so churlish and loopy that
I stopped responding to them."
Much to the amusement of his audience. Silberman also childishly criticized
Linda Greenhouse by speaking of the
"Greenhouse effect," a phrase first
coined in this context by economist and
columnist Thomas Sowell. Never mind
that justices ranging from William Brennan Jr. to William Rehnquist have written
and spoken admiringly of Grcenhousc's
reporting for The New York Times.
Silberman added a few more names to

Greenhouse is at
a loss to explain
which articles
triggered
Silberman's
wrath.
his enemies list before he was done: The
Wall Street Journal (its reporters, not itssimpatico editorialists). The Washington
Post. the Los Angeles Times. and the Associated Press. He even referred to the
-wicked witch of the airwaves." apparently a veiled reference to Nina Totenberg
of National Public Radio.
Greenhouse, who is in her I Ith term as
court correspondent for the Times, says
she found Silberman's attack "basically
baming"-and disturbing as well.
"I trust he is not seeking to use his

4.)

Reporter Linda Greenhouse disagrees with Silberman's thesis.
position to chill or delegitimize penetrating coverage of the federal courts,"
she says.
Greenhouse adds that she has had little
contact with Silberman over the years and
is at a loss to account for which articles
triggered his wrath. She disagrees with his
thesis and holds no brief for activism.
"There are quite a few activists on the
Supreme Court now." she says.
And Greenhouse denies Silberman's
assertion that in the post-Rosenthal era at
the Times-referring to the years since
Executive Editor Abe Rosenthal stepped
down-journalistic advocacy has "run
free."

The Power of the Pen
It

Judge contends colleagues become activists to please the press

used to be that federal judges tually have an influence on judges charge that liberal law professors
were seen and not heard; any who "desire to curry favor."
send left-wing students to clerk and
speaking they had to do was in an
"The press's ceaseless advocacy influence judges.
opinion, and any disagreement with of judicial activism not only induces
Howard conceded that judges
a colleague was settled in chambers. judges to misbehave in the manner I are "pleased when the academy
In recent years, however, fed- have described [by writing for op-ed thinks well of their opinions and
eral judges have been heard
when the press has nice
a lot. Members of the bench,
things to say about them,
from the Supreme Court on
but the notion that they are
down, have tossed hand greinfluenced in any substantive way is far-fetched.
nades at each other in
speeches, opinions and on
"I don't see any evidence of that."
op-ed pages ofAmerica's largest newspapers. Some have
Silberman did get speeven granted interviews tocific in naming reporters and
newspapers that he considheaven forfend-reporters.
Now, in a recent
ered biased. He included the
speech, Judge Laurence Silusual suspects, such as The
berman, of the U.S. Court of
Washington Post and The
New York Times, and added
Appeals for the District of
Columbia, has taken his cola new one: the Associated
Press, a wire service that
leagues to task for those
historically has been known
public breaches of judicial
for cut-and-dry reporting.
etiquette.
James H. Rubin, who
The speech was delivhas covered the Supreme
ered in Washington, D.C.,
Court for the Associated Press
before the conservative Fedfor 10 years, said he would
eralist Society. Perhaps
be "shocked" to find that
aware of the irony of the
what he wrote had any influchosen forum, Silberman took
pains to point out his salvo
ence on judges.
was different.
Rubin said the source of
the judge's displeasure is "a
At the end of a discourse on judicial activism
mystery to me." Reporters at
the AP "pride ourselves on
and the twisting oflanguage,
Silberman added, "I expect
being fair and unbiased," he
said. "It's what we strive
that, in the same Orwellian
fashion, this speech criticizfor."
'Tbny Mauro, in a coling judges for political interumn for Legal Times, sugSome judges "desire to curry favor."
ventions will, in turn, be
described as 'political.'"
-judge Laurence Silberman
gested a motive for Silberman's attack on the objectivRegardless, Silberman
has some interesting and novel pages, for example], but it also has ity of Neil Lewis of The New York
points to make, as well as some its impact on judges' decision-mak- Times. It was Lewis who wrote last
perplexing ones.
ing over time," he said.
year that Silberman had threatened,
In addition to covering such
"I do not think I fully appreci- perhaps without intent, to punch
familiar territory as the sorry state ated until I became ajudge, however, Judge Abner Mikva in the nose.
of the judicial confirmation process, how much impact press coverage can
Lewis recounted the incident a
"Marxist" law reviews, and law have on judges," he said.
second time in a story on philosophiclerks who try to subvert their bosses,
"Of course, those of us who had cal differences amongjudges written
Silberman developed the thesis that been involved in judicial selection about two weeks after Silberman's
a symbiotic relationship exists be- watched with great disappointment speech.
tween the judiciary and the press.
as judges seemed to change on the
The dean of Washington, D.C.,
Liberal American newspapers, bench-or as the press would say, legal writers, Lyle Denniston, a Balhe complained,
"conform
to the same 'grew.'
It was quite frustrating to see timore Sun reporter who has covered
inSEPoEBERt19m2,"AheuSsaid.
JOURAL
24 ABA
line. The working press covers the those particular jurists come to ac- the Supreme Court since 1958, defederal courts, indeed any American cept and even relish the temptations fended the right for judges to be
courts, as if judicial decisions were of activism."
opinionated.
simply the extension of politics by
Silberman offered no specifics
-I think everybody has a First
other means."
for his assertion, which A.E. "Dick" Amendment right to express themHoward, a University of Virginia law selves on any subject, including fedInfluential Words
professor and former Supreme Court eral judges who have little sympathy
Most astonishing was Silber- law clerk, called "an unprovable prop- for the First Amendment," he said.
man's assertion that journalists ac- osition." He likened it to the old
-Henry J. Reske
24 ABA JOURNAL / SEPTEMBER 1992
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Press is a puzzler
with abortion 'spins'
Ifyou found this week's Supreme Court decision on abortion a bit baffling, you probably can blame it on your newspaper.
Many headlines across the USA read as though they were
written by pro-choice or anti-abortion activists rather than
journalists. Examples of the contradictions:
0 The Miami Herald: "Court affirms abortion rights"
10The Orlando Sentinel: "Court weakens abortion rights"
poThe (Oakland) Tribune: "Roe reaffirmed"
0 USA TODAY: "High Court
reins in 'Roe'"
>0San Francisco Chronicle:
"Court upholds right to abortion"
>oChicago Tribune: "Ruling
weakens abortion right"
I' Houston Chronicle:
"Court limits access to abortion"

Those headlines and many
others misfired a little to the
left or right These two may
have been the most pointed

AL

NEUHARTH
TODAY FOUNDER
USA

and most pointless:

1> Star Tribune (Minneapo-

lis): "Abortion ruling lands in
middle"

> New York Newsday:
"Abortion ruling 5-4"
Most journalists try to be objective. But they are human
(honest!): Therefore the "spin" they put on a story or headline sometimes reflects their own preferences or prejudices.
Former Editor in Chief of USA TODAY John C. Quinn
once quipped that a newspaper's philosophy, policy and
style would show through even in the ultimate story - the
end of the world. He predicted these headlines:
0 The New York Times: "World Ends. Third World countries hardest hit"
I' The Washington Post: "World Ends. White House ignored early warnings, unnamed sources say"
>' USA TODAY: "We're Dead! State-by-state demise,
Page 8A. Final, final sports scores, Page 6C' Wiseacre Quinn and the abortion headlines send the
same signal: Don't believe everything you read. And be sure
to look beyond the headlines.

Abortion ruling sends
the networks racing
CNN set the scene at 10 a.m. ET/7 a.m. PT Monday with
pictures inside the Supreme Court of dozens of reporters
awaiting the ruling on the Pennsylvania abortion case.
Minutes later the decision was out Network legal correspondents had little time to read the thick decision but still
had to report the fndings. "There is no way to prepare for
something this complicated," says CBS correspondent Rita
Braver. "Ijust happened to turn to page 6 where the (spousal) notification provision was."
ABC did not air a live picture, opting for Tim O'Brien on
the phone. "Iwas at my desk just a few feet from the press
room," says O'Brien. "It may have given us another 10 or 15
seconds" to look at the ruling. O'Brien did slip on the notification provision, but anchor Peter Jennings quickly made a
correction.
Each network also had legal experts on hand. Winner of
the preparedness award goes to CNN, which had packaged
reports plus live debate on Crier & Co. Two gofers helped
CNN's Anthony Collings.
"We had two runners, one
familiar with the workings
of the court and someone
else who was a little more
fleet of foot who ran outside
in a 15-second sprint to
where Collings was standing," says CNN vice president Earl Casey. (Abortion
ruling, 3A)

News Management at Supreme Court? Not Guilty!

M

ost of official Washington

lineup announced by the court in
particularly indecipherable
labor law case last month:
"Justice Blackmun announced the

spends its time trying to

judgment of the Court and

By Ruth Marcus

w~~gm

Washmas Pos~tff Wnter

M

~

.

uu Wtev
~one

figureout howto
how te.get
umgup=out
maimum
ress covrae. Should
the president speak on prime
time? Should the report bie
embargoed for release in

ddeoldlivered the opinion of the Court

with respect to Parts , , I-B,
Ill-C IV-B (except for the final

Monday's papers, when there is

little competing news? Can the
senator crank out the statement
in time for the-evenirig news?

There are nine excepticis to
this rule. They are all sitting on
the Supreme Court.
Once again, as the court races
toward its summer recess, the
justices are demonstrating their
total UIUnofeie ~lto any
involving First American Batik
armblance of news management. ' w
d.g arrive at the
still hasn't
court come
reporters
This is the court's busiest time
court on decision days this time of
of year, with 25 rulings to get out year feeling-or at least imagining
within the nexl few weeks.
that they feel-something like
For reporters who cover the
M
o
bsfore the play
court, this is their month to get on Only to fd themselves? so far,
the front page as the court, day
out of luck,
-*fter-dsyrissues momenteuOthe-last- ree days tha they
decisions on the pressing legal
have issued decisions, the justices
-issu.o#the-iiedut-things
havcoup Wl I
not Td
aren't quite working out that way.
fondly referred to as "dogs"-the
Granted, this is a slow term at
kinds of rulings that will be lucky if
the court, with the justices
they get an inch of newsprint, that
having taken a few dozen-cases
Are hard to hype onto Page 29, no
less than usual. Still, there are a
less the front page.
number of cases of major interest
Take last week. Please,
remaining on the docket:
Monday opened with four
Does the Constitution protect
decisions, all unanimous. (This is
one's right to dance withoutalready a bad sign.)
One of the cases is about the
pasties and a G-string? Can news
organizations be sued for
time limits for winning parties in
manufacturing quotations? For
Social Security cases to submit
breaking their-promises-to-keep
-their-requesrtort Iees--&,
their sources confidential
as Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
Can someone be thrown in
mellifluously summarized it,
prison for life without pareleif
V'viiethet -- - . istratwe
caught with a pound of cocaine in decision rendered following a
his car? Should the court overrule remand from the District Court is
itself..JL
an let
ulro
X~~ja
iiud
gmen w-nnte
cases hear testimony about the
meaning of EAjA."
murder victim's character?
Another concerns "whether a
Does the Voting Rights Act
debtor can include a mortgage lien
cover judicial elections? Can state in a-Chapter 13 bankruptcy
judges be forced to take
reorganization plan once the
mandatory retirement at age 70?
personal obligation secured by the
about
grumbling grublig
bou it

-So

-~-

Can police board buses and ask
passengers to let thesisearch

luggage for drugi
Some of these cases have been
awaiting a decision since they
were argued inNovember. One
important securities law case

"TV-F, in which Rehnquit..r.
hite, Marshall and Stevens,
ii.. joined, and an opinion with
respect to Parts 1TT-A and IV.
the final paragraph of Part TV-B,
and Parts TV-C and V, in which
Rehnquist, C. and White and
Stevens, ii., joined.
"Marshall, J., filed an opinion
concurring in part and dissenting
in part. Scalia, j. filed an opinion
MIM
i.-nudr
t-hl
pprtAnd dissenting in part, in
ifd.iterUfl
which O' nn
joined, and in all ut rarFTH11-oT
which Kennedy, J., joined.
Kennedy. J., filed an opinion
concurring in the judgment in
'rt and disting in part
Got it?
The news flood may have
crested-o thelastTayoftbe erm
inJune 1988, when the court
issued nine decisions-pholding
the independent counsel law;
.
forbidding capital punishment of
people under 16; and issuing major
rulings in the areas of sexual
abuse of children, employment
discrimination, church-state.
relations-and labor law. Making it
through the day was the Supreme
Court reporter's _quivalent a
triathalon.
The justices. beseeched by
reporters to spread out the news,
561clifaldocWaiig7
They say the decisionsimply
come out as they are printed and

-_and

.paragragili),

-mortgagedpropertyhasbeen

discharged in a Chapter.7
Proceeding."
The third: "Whether claimants
under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, as
amended, are collaterally

RMNuRG-r.EWA94TON MST

tstopped to relingate iF-W~aT
r.*.
iewe&
udiialy
c
agency made with respect to an
age-discrimination claim."
The fourth: a case only a
securities lawyer could love,
uhzday was enly zmginalL
better. The justices took the
bench again and quickly deflated
iiiy-hopes-of mmeeeiting-news,issuing (yet another) bankruptcy
'inibnfiiirinii-edeaI
sentencing guidelines and a
consideration of the difference
between the Fifth Amendment
right to counsel and the Sixth
Amendment right to cdunsel that
even the dissenters said was ol
little practical significance but that
did have the redeeming feature of
coming-on the 25th anniversary of
the Miranda ruling.
The spate of rulings in
relatively minor cases means thur
Th remaining important
ecisioncould-allbe announced
in the space of four days,
o
two more. That means they
won't get the attention they
.~serve, witnout-enougri room in
the newspaper to accommodate a
full recounting, and reporters will
be forced to speed-read opinions
like Evelyn Wood on
amphetamines,
This-is particularly fun when
hecourtissuesonenLits

IV-D,--

.

an

-hoW

true that the hardest cases can
take the longest to decide, and to
IMM
rfroT'
Also, they have life tenure.
Down in the press room.
reporters have to content
themselves with dreams of
winning the annual pool about
when the terrm will end. andwith
how many ruings.

ITu

concurrences and pluraliti- and
Justice Antonin Scalia signing
onto all but the next to last
Paragraph of part three.
Here, for example, islthe

June 27. seven decisions, and 18
separate opinions. But the last
number-counting concurrences
and dissents-is probably overly
optimistic.
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Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation
241 Va. 232 (1991)

HENRY HARPER, ET AL.
V.
VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF TAXATION
Record No. 900770
LAWRENCE

E. LEWY, ET AL.
V.

VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF TAXATION
Record No. 900792
March 1, 1991
Present: Carrico, C.J., Compton, Stephenson. Whiting. Lacy, and Hassell, JJ.,
and Cochran, Retired Justice
The Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury decision of the
United States Supreme Court concerning taxation offederal retiree pensions is not to be applied retroactively;
state law does not require refunds, but grants prospectiveonly application to decisions that Invalidate a taxing
scheme, and the unavailability of refunds includes the tax
year 1988. The trial court's judgment in these consolidated cases is affirmed.
Taxation - State - Constitutional Law - Intergovernmental Tax Immunity - Supremacy Clause - Retrospective Application of Holding - StatuA

tory Construction - Code § 58.1-1826 - Tax Year Defined

In Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803 (1989), the Supreme
Court of the United Sates declared that state taxation of pension income of
retired federal employees, while exempting from taxation pension income of
retired state employees, violated the doctrine of intergovernmental tax im*
munity embodied in the supremacy clause of the Constitution and, there.
fore, was constitutionally prohibited. The Supreme Court, however, did not

decide whether the decision had retrospective application, and these cases

were brought by retired federal employees who receive either federal pension benefits or military retired pay. They filed suits in the trial court
against the Virginia Department of Taxation seeking refunds, pursuant to
Code § 58.1-1826, for state income taxes paid for tax years 1985-1988. The
trial court ruled that Davis should be applied prospectively only, and that
the plaintiffs were not entitled to refunds. Plaintiffs appeal.

1. Whether a constitutional decision of the U.S. Supreme Court is applied ret-

roactively is a matter of federal law and, in the civil context, retroactive
application is governed by the test announced in Chevron Oil Co. v.
Huson,

404 U.S. 97 (1971).

Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation
241 Va. 232 (1991)
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2. In another case, the Court found that its earlier decision invalidating a state
highway tax established a new principle of law under the commerce clause
and that its decision should not be applied retroactively.
3. On the same day, the Court held that a clear and certain remedy, which
could include refunds, was required to remedy a state's unconstitutional liquor tax statute because the state could hardly claim surprise when its statute was invalidated.
4. In the present case, nothing in the record suggests that the Commonwealth
acted other than in good faith reliance upon a presumptively valid taxing
statute. Therefore, the Chevron test must be employed to determine whether
the Davis decision should be applied prospectively only.
5. For a decision to be applied non-retroactively, the first prong of the Chevron
test requires that the decision establish a new principle of law, either by
overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied, or by
deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly
foreshadowed.
6. The intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine was grounded on the proposition that states have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede,
burden or in any manner control, the operations of the federal government.
7. Pre-Davis cases invalidating state taxing statutes were decided on the proposition that the tax had a foreseeable and direct effect on some operation of
the federal government.
8. In the present case, it is difficult to discern how the General Assembly of
Virginia should have been expected to perceive that the scheme of exempting state pensioners from state taxation would have placed any direct burden on some federal operation.
9. The Davis decision established a new rule of law by deciding an issue of first
impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed, and the first
prong of the Chevron test is satisfied.
10. The second prong of the Chevron test requires a court to weigh the merits
and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further
or retard its operation. Since the purpose of the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine already has been fully served, and applying Davis retroactively would do nothing either to retard or to further the doctrine's purpose,
the second prong of Chevron is satisfied.
II. The record supports the conclusion that allowing the requested refunds
would have a potentially disruptive and destructive impact on the Commonwealth's planning, budgeting, and delivering of state services.
12. The equities weigh heavily in favor of the Commonwealth in terms of disallowing retrospective application of Davis. Thus, the third prong of the Chevron test is satisfied.
13. Accordingly, under the Chevron test, the Davis decision is not to be applied
retroactively.
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14. Code §§ 58.1-1825 and -1826 provide that any person assessed with any tax

15.

16.

17.

18.
19.

administered by the Department of Taxation and aggrieved by any such
assessment may within three years from the date such assessment is made,
apply to a circuit court for relief.
Because theDavis dedision is not to be applied retroactively, the pre-Dais
assessments were neither erroneous nor improper within the meaning of
Code § 58.1-1826.
The Virginia Supreme Court has previously held that its ruling declaring a
taxing scheme unconstitutional is to be applied prospectively only. Consider*
ation should be given to the purpose of the new rule, the extent of the reli.
ance on the old rule, and the effect on the administration of justice of a
retroactive application of the new rule.
The last day for filing income tax returns is not the date on which income
taxes are assessed for the preceding year. Rather, when the year has ended,
the tax for that year was fixed and ascertainable. Only payment was delayed
until the date on which payment was due.
The U.S. Supreme Court has said that tax liability depends upon the occur*
rence of the taxed transaction or the enjoyment of the taxed benefit, not the
remittance of the tax.
Under the Chevron test, the Davis decision is not to be applied retroactively,
state law does not require tax refunds, but grants prospective-only application to decisions that invalidate a taxing scheme, and the unavailability of
refunds includes the tax year 1988.

Appeals from judgments of the Circuit Court of the City of Al.
exandria. Hon. Donald H. Kent, judge presiding.
Record No. 900770 Record No. 900792 -

Affirmed.
Affirmed.

Michael J. Kator (Stephen A. Bryant; W. Lester Duty; MaryLeslie Duty; Gregory S. Hooe; Duty and Duty; Traylor & Morris,
on briefs), for appellants. (Record No. 900770)
Gail Starling Marshall, Deputy Attorney General (Mary Sue
Terry, Attorney General; H. Lane Kneedler, Chief Deputy Attorney General; Barbara M. Rose, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Gregory E. Lucyk, Senior Assistant Attorney General;Barbara H. Vann, Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
(Record No. 900770)
Joseph Hyman (Lawrence E. Lewy; George J. Rabin, on briefs),
for appellants. (Record No. 900792)
Gail Starling Marshall, Deputy Attorney General (Mary Sue
Terry, Attorney General; H. Lane Kneedler, Chief Deputy Attor-.
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ney General; Barbara M. Rose, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Gregory E. Lucyk, Senior Assistant Attorney Genbral; Barbara H. Vann, Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
(Record No. 900792)
JUSTICE STEPHENSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803 (1989),
the Supreme Court of the United States declared that state taxation of pension income of retired federal government employees,
while exempting from taxation pension income of retired state
government employees, violated the doctrine of intergovernmental
tax imminity embodied in the supremacy clause of the Constitution of the United States. The Supreme Court, however, did not
decide whether its decision in Davis had retrospective application.'
In these consolidated appeals, the appellants (collectively,
Harper) are retired federal employees who receive either civil service retirement benefits or military retired pay. They filed suits in
the trial court against the Virginia Department of Taxation (the
Commonwealth) in May 1989, seeking refunds, pursuant to Code
1 58.1-1826, for state income taxes paid for tax years 1985, 1986,
1987, and 1988. After consolidating the several suits, the trial
court ruled that Davis should be applied prospectively only and,
therefore, that Harper was not entitled to the refunds. Harper
appeals.
In this appeal, the principal issue is whether Davis should be
applied only prospectively, thereby denying the refunds, or retroactively, thereby granting the refunds.
I
[1] Whether a constitutional decision of the Supreme Court is
applied retroactively is a matter of federal law. American Truck, 110 S.Ct.
,
ing Associations, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 2323, 2330 (1990). In the civil context, retroactive application of
such decisions is governed by the three-pronged test announced in
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971). Smith, 496 U.S.
The Supreme Court did not consider this issue because Michigan conceded that "to
the extent appellant has paid taxes pursuant to this invalid tax scheme, he is entitled to a
nsfund." Davis, 489 U.S. at 817.
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at

, 110 S.Ct. at 2331; see U.S. v. Johnson, 457 U.S.
537,
563 (1982).
[2] InSmith, the Supreme Court considered a state's taxing
statute that previouqly had been declared unconstitutional under
the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution. 496 U.S. at
, 10 S.Ct. at 2329. The Court denied the claimant's request
for a refund of taxes paid prior to an earlier decision that invalidated the taxing statute. Id. at , 110 S.Ct. at 2334. In so
doing, a plurality of the Court employed the three-pronged Chevron test and concluded that its earlier decision should not be applied retroactively. The Court found that its earlier decision invalidating an Arkansas highway tax, American Trucking Assns., Inc.
v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266 (1987), established a "new principle of
law" under the commerce clause. Id. at . , I10 S.Ct. at
Arkansas's legislature, therefore, was justified in relying upon2332.
existing precedent and had "good reason to suppose" the enactment
of the tax would not violate the Federal Constitution. Id. at
I10 S.Ct. at 2333.
Harper contends, nonetheless, that "because the taxes at issue
here . . . constitute[d] an 'unconstitutional deprivation,'
. . Virginia must provide 'backward-looking relief' to the refund . claimants." Harper asserts that such relief is required by the holding
in
McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages
and
Tobacco,
U.S. , 110 S.Ct. 2238 (1990).
[3] In McKesson, decided on the same day as Smith,
the Su.
preme Court held that a "clear and certain remedy," which could
include refunds, was required to remedy Florida's unconstitutional

liquor tax.statute. -

U.S. at

, 110 S.Ct. at

In so
holding, the Court rejected Florida's contention that its2252.
taxing
thority implemented the tax preference scheme "'in good aufaith
reliance on a presumptively valid statute.' " Id. at
, 110 S.Ct.
at 2254. In rejecting that contention, the Court stated
that the
challenged tax statute "reflected only cosmetic changes from
prior version of the tax scheme that itself was virtually identicalthe
to
the Hawaii scheme invalidated" in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias,
468 U.S. 263 (1984). Thus, the Court concluded, Florida
"[could]
hardly claim surprise" when its later statute was invalidated.
Id.
at
-, 110 S.Ct. at 2255.
[4] In the present case, nothing in the record suggests that
Commonwealth acted other than in good faith reliance uponthe
presumptively valid taxing statute. We conclude, pursuant a
to
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Smith, that the three-pronged Chevron test must be employed to
determine whether the Davis decision should be applied prospectively only.
A
[5] For a decision to be applied prospectively only, the first
prong of the Chevron test requires that the decision "establish a
new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on
which litigants may have relied, .

. .

or by deciding an issue of

first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed."
404 U.S. at 106. Satisfaction of this first prong usually has been
stated as the "threshold test" for determining whether or not a
decision should be applied prospectively only. Johnson, 457 U.S.
at 550 n.12.
When Davis was decided, 23 states had statutes similar to the
Michigan statute.2 Virginia's statute had been in effect for almost
half a century. See Acts 1942, c. 325. As far as the record shows,
the federal pensioners had paid the tax without protest. Not a single federal pensioner had brought an action during that period in
a Virginia court seeking a refund of taxes on the basis of the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine. The absence of such litigation reasonably may be explained by examining the doctrine's
origin and development.
[6] The intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine had its gene.
sis in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)
The doctrine was grounded on the proposition that "[s]tates have
no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden oi

ISee Ala. Code Sections 36-27-28 and 40-18-19 (Supp. 1988); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann
Section 43-1022 (Supp. 1988); Ark. Code Ann. Section 26-51-3206; Colo. Rev. Stat. Sec
tion 39-22-104(4)(f) and (g) (Supp. 1988). Ga. Code Ann. Section 48-7-27(a)(4)(A
(Supp.
1988); Iowa Code Ann. Section 97A.12 (West 1984); Kan. Stat. Ann. Section 74
4923(b) (1985); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. Section 16.690 (Michic/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1988)
La.Rev. Stat. Ann. 47:44.1 (Supp. 1989); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. Section 206.30
(1988)
Miss. Code Ann. Section 25-11-129 (1972); Mo. Rev. Stat. Section 86.190 and 104.54
(1986); Mont. Code Ann. Section 15-30-111(2) (1987); N.M. Stat. Ann. Section 10-11
145
(1978); N.Y. Tax Law Section 612(c)(3) McKinney (1987); N.C. Gen. Stat. Sectio
135-9 (1988); Okla. Stat. tit. 68 J 2358 (1988); Ore. Rev. Stat. Section 316.680(1)(c)
an.
(d)(1987); S.C. Code Section 12-7-435(a), (d), and (e) (Supp. 1988); Utah Code Anr
Section 49-1-608 (1989); Va. Code Section 58.1-322(C)(3) (Supp. 1988); W.Va. Cod
Sction II-21-12(c)(5) and (6) (Supp. 1988); Wis. Stat. Section
71.05(I)(a) (Sup;
1988).

239

Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation
241 Va. 232 (1991)

Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation
241 Va. 232 (1991)

in any other manner control, the operations [of the federal govern.
ment]." Id. at 436.
[7] The pre-Davis cases invalidating state taxing statutes were
decided on the proposition that the tax had a foreseeable and direct effect on some operation of the federal government. See, e.g.,
Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Garner, 459 U.S. 392 (1983)
(state tax that imposes greater burden on holders of federal obli.
gations than on holders of similar state obligations impermissibly
discriminates against securities issued by federal government);
Phillips Chemical Co. v. Dumas Indep. Sch. Dist., 361 U.S. 376
(1960) (state tax that imposes greater burden on lessees of federal
property than on lessees of other exempt public property imper.
missibly discriminates against federal government). Indeed, Davis
states that intergovernmental tax immunity is based on "the need
to protect each sovereign's governmental operations from undue
interference by the other." 489 U.S. at 814.
[8-9) In the present case, therefore, it is difficult to discern how
the General Assembly of Virginia should have been expected to
perceive that a statutory scheme, exempting state pensioners from
state taxation, would have placed any foreseeable and direct burden on some federal operation. Consequently, we conclude that
the Davis decision established a new rule of law by deciding an
issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed. Thus, the first prong of the Chevron test is satisfied.

would do nothing either to retard or to further the doctrihe's purpose. Therefore, the second prong of the Chevron test is satisfied.
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B
[10] The second Chevron prong requires a court to "weigh the
merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of
the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospec*
tive operation will further ornretard its operation." 404 U.S. at
106-07. In applying this factor, we must determine whether the
intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine will be retarded or furthered by retroactive application of the Davis decision.
The purpose of intergovernmental tax immunity is not to pro-.
vent legitimate 4tate .taxation. See Smith, 496 U.S. at... , 110
S.Ct.4it 2332. Virginia's taxing statute was legitimate until a new
tile as nqouped in,Davjs..As soon as the General Assembly
WiAlne aware ot the Davis decision, it acted to correct the defects
in its statute. See Acts 1989,-Special Session II, c 3. As a-result,.
the purpose of the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine al*i
ready has been fully served, and applying Davis retroactively 3

C
The' third prong of the Chevron test requires a 'court to
"[weigh] the inequity imposed by retroactive application." 404
U.S. at 107. In weighing the equities, considerable deference must
be accorded a state's reliance upon a statute that was presumptively valid. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973). Indeed, "[i]t is well established that reliance interests weigh heavily
inthe shaping of an appropriate equitable remedy." Id. at 203. As
Chief Justice Burger so aptly stated in Lemon, "statutory or even
judge-made rules of law are hard facts on which people must rely
inmaking decisions and in shaping their conduct. This fact of legal life underpins our modern decisions recognizing a doctrine of
nonretroactivity." Id. at 199.
An important equitable consideration is the effect that retroactive application of a judicial decision may have on a state's financial stability. As the Smith plurality acknowledged, applying a judicial decision retroactively may "have potentially disruptive
consequences for the State and its citizens. A refund, if required
by state or federal law, could deplete the state treasury, thus
threatening the State's current operations and future plans." 496
U.S. at -,
110 S.Ct. at 2333.
In Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073,
1105 (1983), the Supreme Court held that the State of Arizona's
voluntary pension plan violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. The Court further held, however, that the state's liability
would be prospective only. Id. The Court found that retroactive
liability could cost the, state hundreds of millions of dollars. As
Justice Powell stated, "[i]mposihg such unanticipated financial
burdens would come at a time when many States and local govcrnments are struggling to meet substantial fiscal deficits." Id. at
1106-07. Because the illegality of Arizona's actions had not been
deciared until Norris was decided, Justice Powell further stated
that "[t]here is no justification for this Court . . . to impose this
magnitude of burden retroactively on the public." Id. at 1107.
, (11] In the present case, the record discloses that retroactive
'application of the Davis decision would give rise to a potential tax
,refund liability, inclusive of interest, of approximately
$440,000,000. This liability would come at a time when the Com-
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nI althis altcdy,.stroggling to meet, enormous fiscal deficits.

Te,rcord contains affidavits of Commonwealth officials that sup.
port the 6nclusion

that allowing the requested refunds would
have a potentially disruptive and destructive impact on the Con.
monwealth's planning, budgeting, and delivery of essential state
services.
Harper contends, nonetheless, that "it is simply more equitable
to place the financial consequences . . . upon the government

AP
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exonerated from the payment of so much as
is erroneously
improperly charged, if not already paid and, if paid, that or
it
be refunded to him. If the assessment is
less than the proper
amount, the court shall order that the applicant
pay the
proper taxes and to this end the court shall be clothed with
all the powers and duties of the authority which
made the
assessment complained of as of the time when
such
assessment was made and all the powers
and
duties
conferred by
law upon such authority between the time
such assessment
was made and the time such application is heard.
The court
. may order that any amount which has been improperly
collected be refunded to such applicant.

(and thus the whole body of taxpayers) than upon a small
class of taxpayers who had unconstitutionally been forced to subpay
the tax in the first instance.".. Thus, Harper asserts, "taxpayers
who have been paying more than their lawful share of
taxes
should be reimbursed by those who have paid less."
The Commonwealth counters by pointing out that
of
thousands of other Virginia taxpayers have paid. taxes "hundreds
Harper asserts that, even if the Davis decision applies prospecon
their
private pension income but have no claim for monetary relief."
The
tively only, the federal retirees are entitled to refunds under Code
Commonwealth further asserts that "over 2.5 million Virginians
158.1-1826. Harper argues that, because the assessments
annually have paid their 'fair share' of taxes while only some
are unconstitutional,
they also are "erroneous or improper."
thousand state and local retirees were excluded from pensionsixty
f15] We reject this argument. We hold that, because the
in.
come taxation."
Davis
decision is not to be applied retroactively,
the pre-Davis assess[12] The record supports the Commonwealth's assertions,
and
Ments were neither erroneous nor improper within the meaning of
we conclude that, on balance, the equities weigh heavily
in
favor
'Code § 58.1-1826.
of the Commonwealth. Consequently, the third prong of
the Chev[16] Harper's state-law contention also fails for another
ron test is satisfied.
Wpreviously have held that this Court's ruling declaring reason.
[13] Accordingly, we hold that, under the Chevron test, the
a taxDaing scheme unconstitutional is to be applied
vis decision is not to be applied retroactively. Accord
prospectively
only.
Bass v. Perkins v. Albemarle County,
State, 395 S.E.2d 171 (S.C. 1990).
214 Va. 240, 198 S.E.2d 626, af'd
end modified on rehearing, 214 Va. 416, 200 S.E.2d 566
(1973).*
We adhere to our holding in Perkins. In so
doing,
we
follow
the
criteria stated in Fountain v. Fountain,
214
Va.
347,
348,
200
[14] Harper contends, nonetheless, that the refunds are
S.E.2d 513, 514 (1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 939 (1974), that
a matter of state law. He relies upon Code §§ 58.1-1825due as 'consideration should be
given
and
to
the
purpose
of the new rule, the
-1826. Code § 58.1-1825 provides that "[any person
assessed extent of the reliance on the old rule, and the effect on the adminwith any tax administered by the Department of Taxation
and
tration of justice of a retroactive application of the new rule."
aggrieved by any such assessment may . . . within
three years
from the date such assessment is made, apply to a circuit
The case of Capehar: v. City of Chesapeake.
No. 5459 (Circuit Court, City of Chesa.
relief." Code § 58.1-1826 provides, in pertinent part, as court for
ke, decided Oct. 16, 1974). foiiowed Perkins.
follows:
in Capehan,. more than one hundred
uapycrs inthe City of Chesapeake, who had
been subjected to the same practice that was
hajidated
in Perkins, brought suit in circuit court seeking,
If the court is satisfied that the applicant erroneously
among other things, refunds of
or
it txes "iiiegally and unconstitutionally assessed."
improperly assessed with any taxes, the courtismay
The City demurred, citing Perkins.
order that'
1k circuit court sustained the demurrer,
being of opinion that the case was controlled
the assessment be corrected. If the assessment exceeds
by
Mims. We. denied Capehart's petition for
the
appeal, 215 Va. xlvii, and Capehart's petition
fircrtiorari raising due process grounds was
proper amount, the court may order that the applicant be
denied by the Supreme Court, 423 U.S. 875
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See also Quick v. Harris, 214 Va. 632, 634, 202 S.E.2d 869, 871
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(1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 907 (1975).

'

*

III

[17] Finally, Harper contends that "even if Davis were applied
prospectively only, refunds for 1988 taxes would nonetheless be
due, for they were not assessed, and in many cases were not paid,
until after Davis was decided." (Emphasis in original.) Davis was
decided on March 28, 1989. The last day for filing individual income tax returns for the 1988 taxable year was May 1, 1989.
Harper claims that the last day for filing income tax'returns is the
date on which income taxes are assessed for the preceding year.'
We do not agree.
Income taxes are "imposed on the Virginia taxable incomefor
each taxable year of every individual." Code § 58.1-320. (Emphasis added.) The taxable year ended on December 31, 1988,al.
most three months before Davis was decided. When the year ended, the 1988 tax was fixed and ascertainable. Only payment of
the tax was delayed until May 1, 1989. Code § 58.1-341.
[18] The Supreme Court rejected a similar contention in Smith.
The Court reasoned that tax liability depends upon the ." 'occurrence of the taxed transaction or the enjoyment of the taxed beno.
fit, not the remittance of the tax.' " Smith, 496 U.S. at ,
110
S.Ct. at 2335. As Justice O'Cohner observed,
[a] contrary rule would give States a perverse incentive to
collect taxes far in advance of the occurrence of the taxable
transaction. It would also penalize States that do not immediately collect taxes, but nevertheless plan their operations on
the assumption that they will ultimately collect taxes that
have accrued.'

Id. at

-,

10 S.Ct. at 2336*

Harper's reliance upon Code § 58.1-1820 is misplaced. Section 58.1-1820 defines"as
sessment" as that term is used in Article 2 of Chapter IS, which establishes limitatioe
periqds for variotis forms of relief. Individual incomeitax liability isestablished in Articis
qf Chapter 3.
i For the same reason, we reject the contention in Lewy (Record No. 90070)'titi
trial court erred in denying injunctive relief that would have barred the Commonwcabbi
from filing any action to collect taxes from those who, after the Davis decision, had refused
to pay the 1988 taxes.
:e

p.
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[19] In sum,.we hold thati (1) under the Chevron test, the Davis decision is not to be applied retroactively, (2) state law does
not require tax refunds, but to the contrary, grants prospectiveonly application, tQ decisions that invalidate a taxing scheme, and
(3)our denial of refunds includes taxes due for the tax year 1988.
Accordingly, the trial court's judgment will be affirmed.
Record No. 900770-Affirmed.
Record No. 900792-Affirmed.

